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PORNOGRAPHY AND COGNITION: A REPLY
TO CASS SUNSTEIN
PAUL CHEVIGNY*
[Niels Bohr] never trusted a purely formal or mathematical argument.
"No, no," he would say, "You are not thinking; you are just being
logical."1
In Pornography and the First Amendment 2 Cass Sunstein argues
that government censorship of pornography is constitutionally permissi-
ble under the first amendment. As Professor Sunstein himself points out,
his argument in favor of regulation is relatively simple.3 "First, pornog-
raphy is entitled to only a low level of first amendment solicitude; under
any standard, pornography is far afield from the kind of speech that the
first amendment conventionally protects. Second, the harms that porno-
graphic materials produce are sufficient to justify regulation."'4
This reply to Professor Sunstein is not directed to the second part of
the argument-that pornography is harmfuls-but rather to the first. In
short, this essay challenges the way Professor Sunstein categorizes por-
nography as "low value" speech.
As Professor Sunstein openly concedes, the structure of high and
low value speech is not easy to apply to pornography under the current
terms of debate. The contemporary feminist critique of pornography is
rooted in the proposition that pornography is "ideological"-that it fos-
ters a world-view in which women are at best second-class citizens, and
at worst victims. However repulsive such an ideology may be, it falls
within a category of speech that seeks to persuade and thus would be
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I wish to thank Bonnie
Leadbearer, John Broughton, and David Lichtenstein.
1. H. MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, THINKING AND COGNITION 1 (1987), citing D. FRISCH, WHAT
LITTLE I REMEMBER 95 (1979).
2. 1986 DUKE L.J. 589.
3. Professor Sunstein defines "regulable pornography" early on: "regulable pornography must
(a) be sexually explicit, (b) depict women as enjoying or deserving some form of physical abuse, and
(c) have the purpose and effect of producing sexual arousal." Id. at 592.
4. Id. at 608.
5. Questions concerning the strength of the evidence of harm upon which Professor Sunstein
relies, id. at 597-601, are considered in McCormack, Making Sense of Research on Pornography, in
WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP 181-205 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985); Linz, Donnerstein & Penrod, The
Findings and Recommendations of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography: Do the Psy-
chological "Facts" Fit the Political Fury?" 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 946 (1987).
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entitled to high-level protection. Censorship of pornography, as defined
by the feminist critique, also would tend to spill over into the "viewpoint
discrimination" condemned in American Booksellers Association v.
Hudnut. 6
To categorize pornography as low-value speech, Professor Sunstein
has to establish the claim that pornography does not make an "argu-
ment" (as we usually understand the term) in favor of its own ideological
position. "Low-value" speech is characterized by four factors: (1) the
speech is not directly "political;" (2) its method is non-cognitive; (3) it
has a non-communicative purpose; and (4) government is unlikely to be
acting against the speech for impermissible reasons. Pornography, Pro-
fessor Sunstein repeatedly says, is "non-cognitive" speech since it is not
directly concerned with public affairs and "cannot easily be countered by
more speech."'7 Thus, in the case of pornography, the first two factors
characterizing low-value speech are intimately linked to the third: the
ideology implicit in pornography is not "political" and its message is
largely non-communicative because pornography's appeal is "non-cogni-
tive." Professor Sunstein analyzes viewpoint discrimination similarly, ar-
guing that in the light of the harm of pornography, its "viewpoint" holds
less significance since it is "non-cognitive" communication. 8 Even
though Professor Sunstein advances a number of arguments, in the last
analysis the concept of the "non-cognitive" always plays a key role.
What is Professor Sunstein talking about when he refers to "non-
cognitive" communication? For Professor Sunstein, "the term 'cogni-
tive' refers to whether the material is intended to or does in fact impart
knowledge in any sense." 9 He later states that non-cognitive speech com-
municates "indirectly." 10 He draws upon Frederick Schauer, who tells
us: "The term 'cognitive' has a philosophical meaning restricting it to
the propositional and distinguishing it from the emotive. I do not use the
word in that technical sense. To react cognitively is to react mentally, or
intellectually, not necessarily to 'know' a proposition."1
6. 771 F.2d 323, 332-33 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (city ordinance banning
sale and distribution of pornographic materials as discriminatory against women held not viewpoint
neutral); see also Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 461 (1986) (advocating viewpoint neutral anti-pornography regulation).
7. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 617.
8. Id. at 603-04.
9. Id. at 612-17.
10. Id. at 603 n.87.
11. Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity" An Exercise in the Interpreta-
tion of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 922 n.137 (1979) (citation omitted), cited in
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 603 n.88, 606.
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Professor Sunstein recognizes that his reliance upon the cognitive/
non-cognitive dichotomy is troublesome. He confesses, at one point, that
"distinctions between cognitive and emotive aspects of speech are thin
and in some respects pernicious. 12 This thin distinction between cogni-
tive and emotive aspects of speech nevertheless must sustain much of his
argument. What I shall try to show here is that the distinction is consid-
erably more pernicious than Professor Sunstein admits: it is dangerously
incoherent. To reveal that incoherence, I will develop three propositions:
(a) the distinction between "cognitive" and "non-cognitive" communica-
tion is contradictory; (b) if the distinction is construed to refer to an
"intellectual" as opposed to another way of thinking, then it does not
correspond to the way human beings approach problems, whether in so-
ciety or in the natural world; (c) if the distinction is construed to mean
that the "non-cognitive" aspect of speech is directly arousing without the
intervention of thought, then it reflects an incoherent notion of cognition.
I. PASSION AND REASON
The term "non-cognitive" always has been polemical. Some empiri-
cists have used the term to denounce those who refer to "emotive" sub-
jects like values, as distinguished from matters supposedly of
"determinate knowledge."' 13 Professor Sunstein, however, does not have
this naive usage in mind; like Professor Schauer, he uses the term "non-
cognitive" more generally to provide a contrast to an appeal to the
"intellect."
For centuries, philosophers have extolled the virtues of the "ra-
tional," traditionally viewed as an ability to think a question through to
its conclusion in a systematic and impersonal manner. One philosophic
tradition in aesthetics, upon which Professor Finnis and Professor Sun-
stein rely, draws upon the "detached," "objective," or "distant" contem-
plation of subjects of emotion. This philosophic tradition opposes
"passion" to "reason," and the apparent conflict has found its way into
the law.14 Professor Sunstein is not the first, nor the last, to draw on this
dichotomy to support an argument for censoring expression. 15
12. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 604.
13. See A. LACEY, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 37 (2d ed. 1986) (defining "cognitive");
Schauer, supra note 11, at 922 n.137 (to react cognitively is to react mentally, or intellectually, not
necessarily to "know" a proposition).
14. Finnis, "Reason and Passion" The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity,
116 U. PA. L. REv. 222, 234-36 (1967) (discussing the necessity of psychological "distance," al-
lowing a reasoned response, between a work of art and the observer; in contrast, pornography in-
trudes upon and suppresses psychological distance), cited in Sunstein, supra note 2, at 603 n.87.
15. See, eg., Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy and the First
Amendment, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 328-29 (1988) (obscenity, as distinguished from pornography,
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This distinction between "reason" and "passion" also developed in
psychology. Jean Piaget believed that the development, during child-
hood, of a person's ability to grasp and solve physical problems ulti-
mately would result in a level of "formal operations" in which the person
would possess "the capacity to reason in terms of verbally stated hypoth-
eses and no longer merely in terms of concrete objects and their manipu-
lation."1 6 This psychological description of how people solve problems,
however, is outmoded; it is not so much wrong as it is beside the point.
For although mature people learn to reason in abstract ways in which
children cannot, the "hypothetico-deductive" tools that Piaget empha-
sized are but the smallest part of adult thinking.17
In contrast to Piaget's assumptions about abstract thought, psychol-
ogists now recognize that "the cognitive capacity" is not unitary. Cogni-
tive capacities include visual and other sorts of sensory perception, along
with linguistic ways of understanding. For example, Howard Gardner
has identified separable bodily-kinesthetic and musical intelligence.1 8
However psychologists may describe and distinguish mental capacities,
the important point is that these capacities are not ordered by a capacity
for "formal operations" in Piaget's sense, nor indeed by any other intel-
lectual capacity we can identify.19
Thinking about any subject draws on a diversity of cognitive capaci-
ties; it often involves visual imagery and other sensory cognition. For
example, Albert Einstein emphasized the importance of imagery to his
thought process in a description of his approach to a new problem in
physics:
The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem
to play any role in my mechanisms of thought. The physical entities
which seem to serve as elements of thought are certain signs and more
or less clear images which can be voluntarily reproduced or
combined.20
may be censored because it "'pertains, not to the realm of ideas, reason, intellectual content and
truth-seeking, but to the realm of passion, desires, cravings and titillation' ").
16. Piaget, Intellectual Developmentfrom Adolescence to Adulthood, 15 HUM. DEV. 1, 3 (1972).
17. Broughton, Not Beyond Formal Operations But Beyond Piaget, in BEYOND FORMAL OPER-
ATIONS 395, 404-05 (M. Commons ed. 1984).
18. H. GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES 99-127,
205-236 (1983).
19. See id. at 23-27 (a "single, highly general problem-solving mechanism" cannot be brought
to bear on the full range of human problems); see also J. FODOR, MODULARITY OF MIND: AN
ESSAY ON FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY 119-26 (1983) (both domain specific computational mechanisms
and horizontal cognitive systems exist).
20. Einstein, "Letter," in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVENTION IN THE MATHEMATICAL FIELD
142 (J. Hadamard ed. 1975), quoted in V. JOHN-STEINER, NOTEBOOKS OF THE MIND: EXPLORA-
TIONS OF THINKING 4 (1987) (Einstein's comments used as exemplary answer to the question, "How
do you think?").
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Others, less mistrustful of verbal or written language than Einstein
(for better or for worse), draw on past linguistic constructs in resolving a
new problem, or merely in reviewing another's view. In this heterogene-
ous mix of perception and thinking, everything may be labeled "cogni-
tive." All perception and thought aid in our comprehension of the
world; the notion that some of these are "non-cognitive" because they
are not "intellectual" is almost an incoherent distinction.
This point is not merely a definitional quibble. Professor Sunstein,
along with other legal scholars who use distinctions like cognitive and
non-cognitive, might isolate the deliberate, the intellectual, the rational
capacity (supposing we could isolate it), and label it anything they like.
Of course, such an exercise would only be useful if in fact such a capacity
could function the way they claim it does. The problem is that it does
not. Studies suggest that all people, from the most professorial to the
most "intuitive," make relatively little use of "reason" in the sense de-
scribed by philosophy's reason/passion dichotomy or in Piaget's notion
of "formal operations."'21
A recent study is illustrative. Researchers asked their subjects to
read a character sketch and then answer questions about the character.
They read the following description:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored
in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
demonstrations.
In answering questions, most subjects said that the proposition, "Linda is
a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement," was more likely as
a characterization than the proposition, "Linda is a bank teller,"'22 in
defiance of the basic probability that a single characteristic-like that set
forth in the second proposition-is more probable than a conjunctive
characteristic. The temptation to stick to the first proposition is ex-
tremely strong. In reference to this experiment, Stephen Jay Gould re-
cently wrote: "I know that the [conjunctive] statement is least probable,
yet a little homunculus in my head continues to jump up and down,
shouting at me-'but she can't just be a bank teller; read the
21. See, eg., Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 3 (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, A.
Tversky eds. 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY]; R. NIsnarr & L. Ross,
HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 11-12, 65-192
(1980).
22. Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment of and by Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UN-
CERTAINTY, supra note 21, at 84, 92-93.
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description.' "23
The point of such experiments is that people use devices of intuitive
reasoning-heuristic short-cuts-in interpreting a new social situation.
These heuristics include (1) "representativeness," which infers causal re-
lations from a perceived resemblance to an exemplary case; (2) "availa-
bility," which selects the most salient pattern of a problem situation to
serve as an analytic framework; and (3) "anchoring," which encourages
people to stick to their initial judgments and only slightly alter them in
light of subsequent evidence. The "feminist bank teller" experiment
aptly illustrates all of these heuristics.
The experiments, and the heuristics they reveal, are linked to an-
other body of psychological research involving the effort to simulate
thinking by computer. These studies indicate that people use an array of
"frames" or "scenarios," drawn from our past experiences (or someone
else's experiences), in addition to a vast midden of interrelated linguistic
meanings (similarly understood through scenarios), to interpret even
simple propositions about the social world.24
A moment's reflection reveals, I think, that this reliance on past sce-
narios is inevitable. The world--especially the social world-is not or-
ganized to convey meaning. Physical change or "behavior" in
themselves have no self-sustaining meaning. We must organize our expe-
rience of the world through a host of paradigmatic narratives-exem-
plary tales about our own beliefs. It is these narratives that give the
world a "drift" or a "go," which appears intentional in the way that
narratives are always intentional. Recent analyses of the-interpretation
of laws to resolve a new legal problem have reached similar conclusions;
legal analysis uses a narrative scenario that exemplifies the purpose of the
law in its application.25 Analogously, people's descriptions of physical
laws are couched in examples that exhibit an intentional component. 26
The intuitive heuristics discussed above (necessary, but dangerous) are
special applications of a cognitive habit of using narrative as an organiz-
ing tool; for example, the narrative about Linda does not fit the paradigm
of a bank teller. Thus the hypothetico-deductive model does not, and
23. Gould, The Streak of Streaks, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 18, 1988, at 8, 12 (review of M.
SEIDEL, STREAK: JOE DIMAGGIO AND THE SUMMER OF '41).
24. See R. SCHANK & R. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS AND UNDERSTANDING 36-68
(1977); see also P. CHEVIGNY, MORE SPEECH: DIALOGUE RIGHTS AND MODERN LIBERTY 59-66
(1988).
25. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 65-88 (1986); H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 292-94
(G. Burden & J. Cumming trans. 1975); Richards, Interpretation and Historiography, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 489, 548-49 (1985) (proposing that "constitutional interpretation must delve into the history
and nature of large cultural and political traditions, which constitutionalism express").
26. P. CHEVIGNY, supra note 24, at 44-46.
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could not, describe people's thought about either new or familiar
problems. The starting place for any problem is an initial judgment be-
cause, after all, no problem offers its own solution. Our emotions and
our beliefs, as well as our "intellect," inform this initial judgment.
The findings of psychologists about pornography and its harm are
easily adapted to this view of social judgment. In a typical pornography
experiment, a male subject, often one who has been angered by a woman
as part of the experiment, watches a film depicting sexual violence
against a woman. The film is likely to increase the subject's aggressive-
ness toward women27 because, apparently, the film cues to a scenario in
which inflicting violence seems pleasurable and inhibitions against it are
lifted. Thus the film exemplifies an argument for violence against wo-
men. It is like other propaganda, and the position to which the propa-
gandist seeks to persuade us is linked dramatically to pre-existing
stereotypes. Indeed, among the most important things that the pornog-
raphy experiments suggest is that powerful stereotypes about women and
violence do exist.28 These experiments do not suggest, however, that the
viewer's reaction to pornography (when he responds as the pornographer
wishes) is essentially different from a sympathetic viewer's reaction to
other forms of persuasion.
Propaganda is powerful because it is consistent with people's way of
thinking.29 We cannot escape our stereotypes through "rationality" or
"detachment"; stereotypes are the principal tools for thinking that we
have. Deductive thought cannot provide the patterns for comparison
that our stock of narratives and examples supplies. 30 The puzzle of
human inquiry is that people actually come up with new patterns and
sometimes change their beliefs. But they can do so only by combining
existing patterns cast together in an unforeseeable way. Detached "logi-
cal" thought is not the primary mechanism for change of the beliefs that
feed our intuitive heuristics; rather, our beliefs change because a combi-
nation of tales connects with our existing beliefs in a new way that we
find persuasive. Creative thinking-new solutions to problems-thus
cannot be radically disassociated from commonplace thinking, or even
from propagandistic persuasion. The patterns of understanding that we
already possess are linked to our "passions" through our beliefs, and are
as essential to creative change as they are to ordinary expressions of prej-
27. See, ag., Donnerstein, Pornography: Its Effect on Violence Against Women, in PORNOGRA.
PHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION 53, 64-69 (N. Malamuth & E. Donnerstein eds. 1984) (increased
aggressiveness towards women observed in three studies).
28. See Malamuth, Aggression Against Women: Cultural and Individual Causes, in PORNOG-
RAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION, supra note 27, at 19, 31-32.
29. See P. CHEVIGNY, supra note 24, at 63-64.
30. See id. at 63-64.
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udice. "Formal operations," as Piaget understood them, enter in to
check an apercu that a person has already made through "non-formal"
means-that is, through a stock of images, meanings, and other cognitive
tools.
The course of cognition, from initial conception through final proof,
can be illustrated in one of Einstein's thought-experiments. Einstein con-
ceptualized one problem of relativity by imagining himself riding on a
light wave and comparing his motion with the motion of other things. In
doing this, he drew upon non-verbal schemas about nature as he under-
stood it-stereotypes or scenarios of motion. He thus combined his kin-
esthetic sense and visual imagery to pose the problem by creating an
apparent paradox in existing scenarios on the nature of waves versus par-
ticles; this gave him a means of comprehending the nature of light.
Einstein's originality lay not only in his ability to imagine a problem
physically, but also in his ability to construct a broader scenario that
could resolve the problem. Through the special theory of relativity, he
found a way to check the accuracy of his thoughts, and articulated it in a
manner that could be tested again in an experiment. 31 This formal stage,
although important for the transmission of scientific knowledge and the
falsification of theories, is not the source either of the perception of the
problem or of its solution. Most important for the present discussion,
Einstein did not find his solution through the type of "intellectual" argu-
ment that Professor Sunstein identifies as of "high value," but rather
through a combination of scenarios about the operation of nature. Ein-
stein followed the admonition of Niels Bohr quoted in the epigraph
above: he was not just being logical, he was thinking. Although Ein-
stein's insight and his faith in his intuition was extraordinary, his mode
of "cognition" did not essentially differ from the way others make judg-
ments about society or nature.
The reasons outlined above indicate that censorship cannot be justi-
fied on the ground that it is directed against the products of passion as
distinguished from reason.32 There is no proper method of thinking-no
royal road through logic to cognition as opposed to a low road through
prejudice and passion. We may think our judgments are "detached" or
contemplative, but they are as much rooted in our prejudgments as are
snap decisions. More important, this dependence on prejudgment is in-
evitable because all of our judgments-those that withstand the scrutiny
of deductive logic and those that do not-stem from the same sources.
Judgments, moreover, can be changed only through an appeal to other
31. See, e.g., H. PAGELS, COSMIC CODE 23-24 (1982).
32. See H. MARGOLIS, supra note 1, at 3 (recognition of patterns or attunements pre-exist and
direct rational thought).
Vol. 1989:420]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
prejudgments, which exist in patterns that are neither logical nor predict-
able. As Howard Margolis has said: "The tuning of patterns of response
to patterns of experience [is] not just an aspect of cognition but [its] cen-
tral notion."'33
II. SHORT-CIRCUITING THE COMMUNICATIVE
The notion of non-cognitive speech, as Professor Sunstein and
others have invoked it to distinguish pornography or obscenity, goes be-
yond the dichotomy between reason and passion. A colleague, who was
exasperated by arguments like mine, came close to the idea by claiming
that pornography is special because people "get off on it."
Professor Sunstein makes a similar distinction about non-cognitive
speech: "Though comprised of words and pictures... [pornography] is
more akin to a sexual aid than a communicative expression."' 34 Its ap-
peal is non-cognitive because its "effect and intent ... are to produce
sexual arousal."'35 Professor Sunstein's point appears to be that pornog-
raphy acts directly to arouse people sexually, more like a drug or physi-
cal stimulus than communication. He reinforces this point by
analogizing pornography to "fighting words"-to a face-to-face provoca-
tion to fight.36 Professor Sunstein characterizes the experience of por-
nography as that of "passion" in its original sense: an experience that we
"undergo" and over which we have no control.
Pornography is not the only form of expression that evokes such
claims. Social commentators like to associate passion with any type of
expression that they find particularly repulsive. Consider Professor Al-
lan Bloom's comment on contemporary popular music: "[R]ock music
has one appeal only, a barbaric appeal, to sexual desire-not love, not
eros, but sexual desire undeveloped and untutored. ' 37
Professor Bloom also claims that rock music "has a much more
powerful effect than does pornography on youngsters, who have no need
to watch others do grossly what they can so easily do themselves," and
that in rock music, "life is made into a nonstop, commercially prepack-
aged masturbational fantasy."'38
Although this example may strike some readers as silly, Professor
Bloom's underlying argument parallels Professor Sunstein's argument
33. Id. A detailed argument along these lines appears in P. CHEVIGNY, supra note 24, at 59.
34. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 606.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 513-16.
37. A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 73-75 (1987). Professor Bloom prob-
ably uses "pornography" in a more traditional sense than Professor Sunstein.
38. Id. at 74, 75.
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about pornography. The implications of Professor Bloom's psychology
of rock music can be characterized as follows:
Rock music presents the listener with kinesthetic stimuli that suggest
sexual activity through analogous rhythmic patterns and by actual imi-
tative sounds. At the same time, the lyrics both urge and represent
sexual activity. The music thus only incidentally brings the pleasure of
music, more fundamentally it arouses the listener through kinesthetic
sense. Rock music does not express erotic or sexual longing; it does
not "express" anything, but merely arouses.
Similarly, Professor Sunstein's psychology of pornography can be re-
stated as follows:
Pornographic film presents the viewer with visual stimuli that repre-
sent sexual activity. At the same time, the film depicts the degradation
of women and connects it with sexual pleasure. The film arouses view-
ers to engage in sexual activity through visual images. In the course of
such arousal, it also directly arouses viewers to repeat the degradation
without any intervening thought.
These scenarios representing the Bloom and Sunstein theories are
incoherent. How could rock music bypass the human cognitive sense
and drive a person, through some black magic, to a sexual act? Instead
the music appeals to our kinesthetic sense; listeners draw a pattern from
the realm of music and imagine it to be like a sexual pattern. The rest
may follow from that imagination. Similarly, we do not know how a
pornographic film can bypass the visual sense, and through magic arouse
a person to an act of sexual degradation. Rather, viewers draw a pattern
of sexual relations from their imagination and that pattern arouses. In
short, neither a film nor music can bypass the imagination. 39 Expression
can sometimes arouse people because it enables them to picture (or per-
haps verbally represent) a state of affairs that causes arousal. The curi-
ous psychological fact is that the imagination of something arousing can
actually lead to arousal. This insight, however, is no different for por-
nography than for any other expression. 4° Expression always reaches us
through some imaginative pattern or patterns that we already under-
stand, rather than through some mythical path of direct stimulation.
Our ability to picture or state a scenario for action enables us to make a
decision and take action.
This principle about expression becomes more clear if we reflect that
"pornography" does not have the same effect on every viewer and under
all circumstances. Some viewers are aroused sexually, some are revolted,
39. There is the familiar phenomenon in which a repeated rhythmic pattern may, in a receptive
subject, result in a trance-like state, but it does not appear that either Professor Sunstein or Professor
Bloom has that case in mind. See G. ROUGET, LA MusIQUE ET LA TRUSE 436-37 (1980).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
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and some are enraged by a depiction of the degradation of women. Por-
nographic film scenes and still photos also can be reassembled to make a
rather different piece of propaganda-an appeal against pornography in
favor of censorship. Similarly, elements of racist or authoritarian propa-
ganda can be reassembled to produce propaganda against racism and au-
thoritarianism. Pornographic scenes thus may be arousing, but the
action or belief that they arouse depends on each viewer's imagination
and beliefs. Pornography can be a "sexual aid" for some viewers because
their imagination enables them to use it as a sexual aid.
No intelligible cognitive theory supports Professor Sunstein's asser-
tion that pornography can cause unmediated arousal leading to degrada-
tion. Supporters of the cognitive/non-cognitive dichotomy might
nevertheless retreat to their more general argument, by claiming that the
imagination-the belief-system through which arousal may be chan-
neled-is after all not "cognition," and that the patterns of belief con-
nected to desire, whether musical, visual or even verbal, are separated
from the cognitive capacity. 4' That position, however, is untenable be-
cause cognition does not function without the imagination. If we inter-
pret the world of our experiences through our schemas, scenarios, and
exemplary narratives, as I claim we do, then we understand events only
insofar as we are able to imagine them. Those persuaded by pornogra-
phy's ideology come to imagine the degradation of women as pleasurable
just because their previous stock of sexual fantasies includes some scena-
rio that corresponds to this ideology. Those who are offended by pornog-
raphy's ideology imagine its abolition because they conceive of a socio-
legal world in which such outrages would not be possible.
According to Professor Sunstein's conception of the problem, "the
'message' of pornography is communicated indirectly and not through
rational persuasion. The harm it produces cannot easily be countered by
more speech because it bypasses the process of public consideration and
debate .. ."42 But this argument merely exposes the poverty of the
conception of the "cognitive" in the reason/passion dichotomy of psy-
chology. While it is possible to make a "direct" and abstract argument,
in Professor Sunstein's sense, for pornography's subjection of women,
such an argument would have little force. Pornography's message is
powerful precisely because it does not argue but represents what it has to
say in a way that arouses some of the audience. The same is true of all
persuasion. For example, arguments against poverty are not powerful
when they abstractly oppose economic inequality, but they gain force
41. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
42. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 616-17.
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when they enable the affluent to imagine the plight of the poor and, con-
versely, permit the poor to imagine a better life. Likewise, arguments
denouncing society's treatment of women are powerful because they
make it possible for men to imagine the plight of women and for women
to imagine a different life. These arguments persuade because they
arouse us (not in the sexual sense, of course) to envision action and per-
haps to undertake it. That is just what it means for them to be
persuasive.
Professor Sunstein's analogy of pornography with fighting words is
rather misleading.43 The problem with pornography is (usually) not that
it incites the viewer to action when he is with a potential victim; pornog-
raphy would present a different and simpler problem in that case.
Rather, pornography attempts to persuade a viewer to adopt a world-
view, even when he is viewing alone. There is as much (or as little) time
for responsive scenarios in the case of pornography as there is for any
other compelling argument. The response is essential, however, because
only answering scenarios can replace the argument implicit in
pornography.
When we think about how people actually understand problems-in
the sense of accepting a course of action as a solution-it is clear why
most persuasive arguments have an "indirect" effect in Professor Sun-
stein's sense. Persuasive arguments represent a message in words and
images carefully chosen to elicit a response through pre-existing beliefs.
We may come to see, through the use of formal operations or other per-
suasive scenarios, that an argument is wrong. But we will never be per-
suaded unless we can imagine the world in the way the counter-argument
presents it.
CONCLUSION
Why write this reply? It is certainly not an effort to support pornog-
raphy, which seems to need no encouragement. According to my own
approach to changing opinions, as I have outlined them, I am not likely
to persuade Cass Sunstein or the others who use a cognitive/non-cogni-
tive dichotomy, to change their views by a mere "intellectual" demon-
stration that their argument is incoherent and unsupported by empirical
evidence. My critique requires a narrative about rights that replaces the
argument that pornography is "non-cognitive" speech and that will not
treat pornography as "harmless." The possibility of such a narrative is
the reason for this reply.
43. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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Pornography is not, as I have said, simply unmediated arousal.
Ideologically, it is an argument by representation, like other propaganda,
and it appeals only to those whose belief-systems are receptive. Like
propaganda in favor of racism or violent authoritarianism, it takes hold
only when stereotypes are readily available to the viewer and are ac-
cepted as "representative" of the world. Such propaganda, moreover, is
dangerous for the same reasons that pornography is dangerous.
Suppressing pornography, like suppressing any other powerful prop-
aganda, is beside the point in a cognitive world 44 where we can interpret
new experience only through existing patterns. An effective response to
pornography must provide a different view of relations between men and
women, because only such a response can replace the beliefs that sustain
pornography. If expression is dangerous enough to be a candidate for
suppression, then it is important enough to warrant a persuasive
response.
Because of the flawed psychology that underlies it, censorship can
not destroy the scenarios that underlie pornography. Only a more per-
suasive picture of new relations between men and women can reverse
pornography's message.
44. See generally P. CHEVIGNY, supra note 24, at 53-72 (outlining views on cognition and
rationality).
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